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Case No. 910500

TAMARA HOLDEN, Warden of the
Utah State Prison, State of Utah

Category No. 3

Defendant-Appellant
and Cross-Appellee.
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TAMARA HOLDEN, Warden of the
Utah State Prison, State of Utah
Defendant-Appellant
and Cross-Appellee.'

Plaintiff-Appellee and Cross-Appellant Ronnie Lee Gardner, through his volunteer
counsel, requests this Court to vacate its decision of November 10, 1994 and rehear this
appeal and cross-appeal. This Petition for Rehearing is supported by the following argument
and authorities:
INTRODUCTION
In this capital case, the reasons for the Court's decision to overturn the district court's
grant of a new sentencing and new appeal, and to affirm the denial of relief on other
grounds, are only partially known. Chief Justice Zimmerman and Justice Durham concurred
in the result only, and did not explain the grounds for their decision. In the absence of a
majority opinion of any opinion by Chief Justice Zimmerman or Justice Durham, this Petition
can respond only to the opinion by Justice Stewart, which was joined by Justice Howe. The
Stewart opinion will be cited as "Slip op." and referred to in the text as "Opinion".

ARGUMENT
Habeas Review
Justice Stewart's statement that six issues would not be reviewed on the merits is
inconsistent with rulings in other habeas corpus and postconviction cases. As Chief Justice
Zimmerman has said, the essential question under the "unusual circumstances" test is: Is
there a sufficiently good reason why issues were not raised earlier? Dunn v. Cook. 791 P.2d
873 (Utah 1990) (Zimmerman, J., concurring).
In Dunn, Chief Justice Zimmerman concluded that deficient representation on appeal
constituted an unusual circumstance, allowing consideration of an ineffective assistance claim
in a collateral attack. 791 P.2d at 878. Justice Stewart, joined by Justice Durham,
determined in Dunn that the cause and prejudicial standard used by federal habeas corpus
courts to resolve procedural default issues is too strict to be applied by Utah state courts.
791 P.2d at 876. Under the federal standard, ineffective assistance of counsel is cause for
the failure to raise an issue. Murray v. Carrier. 477 U.S. 478 (1986). Therefore, at least
three members of the Court would find unusual circumstances if the failure to raise an issue
on appeal was the result of ineffective assistance of counsel.
Mr. Gardner continues to contend that he received ineffective assistance of counsel on
appeal. See, infra, at 9 . Further, in stating that the claim based on Robert Maori's
hypnotically enhanced testimony would not be reviewed, Justice Stewart condones an unfair
process by allowing the State to withhold waiver arguments iji the district court, yet assert
them on appeal. The defense of procedural bar must be pleaded and proved by the State,
and, after consideration of the facts and arguments offered in response by a petitioner, the
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district court should enter findings of fact as to the circumstances under which an issue was
not previously raised.
Hypnotically Enhanced Testimony
Justice Stewart misapprehended the facts in ruling that the admission of hypnotically
enhanced testimony was not fundamentally unfair because it went only to a collateral issue.
The defense presented at trial centered on the contention that Mr. Gardner did not
intentionally kill Mr. Burdell. See State v. Gardner. 789 P.2d 273, 290-91 (Utah 1989)
(Zimmerman, J., concurring). Trial counsel attempted to show that Mr. Gardner was in
shock from the wound in his chest and lung, and that he accidentally shot Mr. Burdell when
the closing door startled him.
As trial counsel Andy Valdez explained in the postconviction hearing, Robert Macri's
testimony at the preliminary hearing was important to this defense. Mr. Macri testified there
that the events in the file room occurred in a matter of seconds, and that the door started to
close "practically simultaneously" with the shot. (T. 960-61, 964). Based on the preliminary
hearing testimony, trial counsel believed that there had not been enough time for Mr.
Gardner to plan and intend the shooting. (H. 141). However, on the day before the trial
began, counsel learned that Mr. Macri's account of the events had changed, and that his
difference in his testimony would be "devastating." (H. 141-42). In his trial testimony, Mr.
Macri asserted that Mr. Gardner was moving the gun toward Mr. Burdell, and that he caused
the door to close as he attempted to avoid being shot. (T. 2217). Rather than being
"collateral," the issues of how the door closed and whether Mr. Gardner was startled into
firing the gun were crucial to his defense based on lack of intent.
3

Victim Impact Evidence
In ruling that no injustice resulted from testimony and arguments about
commendable characteristics of the victim, Michael Burdell, Justice Stewart failed to address
the inequity of allowing the prosecution to place this information before jurors while
precluding the defense Gardner from advising them that he would not have wanted the death
penalty for Mr. Gardner. It was unfair to allow evidence praising and invoking sympathy for
Mr. Burdell without the balancing fact he would not have approved of a death sentence
imposed to his punish his death, and that his family and friends did not seek Mr. Gardner's
execution in retribution for the crime.
Ineffective Assistance at Trial
(1) Mitigation
In reversing the district court's decision that trial counsel provided ineffective
assistance in the penalty phase of the case, Justice Stewart misapprehended the issue raised by
Mr. Gardner, the conclusion reached by the court below and its supporting facts. The
Opinion characterized the issue as follows: "The district court vacated Gardner's death
sentence and granted him a new penalty hearing because defense counsel failed to provide
Gardner's expert psychiatric witness sufficient time to examine Gardner prior to testifying at
the penalty hearing." (Slip op. at 9).
However, Mr. Gardner's Petition for Postconviction Relief and/or Writ of Habeas
Corpus included the claim that trial counsel had provided ineffective assistance in
investigating and presenting a case in mitigation. The trial court's ruling also addressed more
than the issue of whether counsel had provided enough time for Dr. Peter Heinbecker's
4

interview of Mr. Gardner. The court below found that trial counsel failed to present a
cohesive and understandable theory of mitigation, that they did not adequately investigate
mental health issues before trial and that a satisfactory mental health evaluation had never
been conducted. (Memorandum Decision, at 23-24).
In this ruling, the trial court's findings focus not only on the fact that trial counsel
contacted Dr. Heinbecker "a mere 24 hours before he testified," (Memorandum Decision, at
23), but also on the facts that counsel did not seek testimony from Dr. Mark Rindflesh, and
that after discussing the case with Dr. Agnes Plenk, "[njo turther effort was made to seek
professional assistance for petitioner, nor seek State assistance in doing so." (Memorandum
Decision, at 24). Rather than addressing only the "failure to provide more time to Dr,
Heinbecker to prepare," (Slip op. at 13), the district court considered all of counsel's actions
and omissions in failing to investigate and obtain effective mental health mitigating evidence.
Justice Stewart also misapprehended the facts in deciding that Mr. Gardner was not
prejudiced by any insufficiency of the case in mitigation. Although the State argued below
that there was no evidence of organic brain dysfunction in the record, Justice Stewart
concluded that there was no prejudice in part because "Dr. Heinbecker testified [at the
penalty hearing] that Gardner suffered from organic brain damage." (Slip op. at 11).
At the sentencing hearing, Dr. Heinbecker's testimony was tentative and equivocal,
and he made a point of informing jurors out that he had not had enough time to prepare. In
interviewing Mr. Gardner for one hour, discussing him with family members for about 2.5
hours and reviewing incomplete records, Dr. Heinbecker "tried to pick out ... general factors
that were important," and found in early records "some evidence that he had organic brain
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damage" as a result of meningitis and sniffing glue and gasoline. (T. 2796). Crossexamination focused on whether organic brain syndrome had ever been actually diagnose or
was merely a possibility. The prosecution effectively challenged Dr. Heinbecker's
interpretation of the old records, and impeached him with a report he had not reviewed. Dr.
Heinbecker's trial testimony only established that additional testing was required to prove or
rule out organic brain syndrome.
Justice Stewart also noted that Dr. Heinbecker discussed three other factors. But
again, only a superficial treatment of these factors was possible, and the language Dr.
Heinbecker used was equivocal. Overall, the testimony from Dr. Heinbecker and other
defense witnesses painted a picture of Mr. Gardner as a wilful child who simply chose to
avoid discipline from his father, to skip school, to experiment with drugs and to run from
juvenile placements. Dr. Heinbecker's suggestion that Mr. Gardner grew up in an unstable
environment, that his parents had been inadequate and neglected him and that his antisocial
personality might have been genetic in origin did little to explain or ameliorate this portrait.
Finally, Justice Stewart concluded that Mr. Gardner did not satisfy his "burden, in the
habeas proceeding, to adduce what favorable evidence could have been presented in his
behalf." (Slip op. at 11). In the absence of investigative and expert assistance, Mr. Gardner
has not had a full and fair opportunity to litigate this issue. Mr. Gardner sought but was
refused assistance in investigating and evaluating psychiatric, psychological and sociological
mitigation. Dr. Heinbecker was not called as an expert in how to investigate mitigation, and
he has never performed an adequate evaluation of Mr. Gardner. He was called to testify
about the facts surrounding his penalty phase testimony. He did identify tests which should
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have been conducted to explore organic brain syndrome, but his testimony was not and could
not have been a substitute for that of a defense expert. Justice Stewart seems to suggest that
Mr. Gardner should have elicited testimony from requiring Dr. Heinbecker faulting his own
evaluation and penalty phase testimony. It is fundamentally unfair to hold that Mr. Gardner
has not established prejudice when the State has refused to fund the defense services essential
to this showing.
(2) Other trial issues
In his opinion, Justice Stewart summarily disposed of three ineffective assistance
claims on the basis that they had been decided on direct appeal, directly or "in substance."
(Slip op. at 7). These claims were that: (1) counsel were ineffective in deciding that Mr.
Gardner should testify and pressuring him to do so; (2) counsel were ineffective in eliciting
Mr. Gardner's criminal record during his direct examination; and (3) counsel were ineffective
in failing to request a bifurcated proceeding to address the aggravating circumstance of a
prior violent crime, under with Utah Code Ann. Section 76-5-202(1 )(h). Mr. Gardner
contends that this summary disposition rests on an incorrect reading of the opinion in his
direct appeal, State v. Gardner. 789 P.2d 273 (Utah 1989) [Gardner I].
As for claims (2) and (3), Justice Stewart concluded that they were resolved in two
concurring opinions in Gardner I. However, then-Justice Zimmerman, joined by Justice
Durham, and Justice Stewart decided only that the trial court's error in allowing evidence of
two robbery convictions in the guilt phase, before the jury had found Mr. Gardner guilty of a
knowing or intentional murder, was not prejudicial. 789 P.2d at 290-91. This issue is
distinct from the postconviction claims that counsel should not have questioned Mr. Gardner
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in the guilt phase direct examination about his criminal record, which included inadmissible
convictions for aggravated assault and homicide, and that they should not have acquiesced in
the non-bifurcated procedure used by the trial court. Although Justice Stewart correctly noted
that the use of the robbery convictions was found to be harmless in Gardner I. that resolution
does not answer the ineffective assistance claims here. The conclusion that any error was
harmless relied in part on the fact that "Gardner took the stand and disclosed his extensive
criminal record, which included other convictions that were more prejudicial than the two
robberies." 789 P.2d at 290.
Similarly, the claim that trial counsel acted unreasonably in deciding that Mr. Gardner
should testify is different from the issue determined on direct appeal ~ that his alleged
statements to Officer Jorgensen were admissible to impeach that testimony. Other important
factors that were asserted in this claim were: counsel's belief that Mr. Gardner's criminal
record would be admitted if he testified and that jurors would receive a negative impression
when he refused to disclose the name of his accomplice. Although the Opinion does not
address these factors, taken as a whole they establish that the decision to have Mr. Gardner
testify was ineffective.
Ineffective Assistance on Appeal and in Conflicts of Interest
For the reasons stated in his briefs, Mr. Gardner contends that Justice Stewart's
opinion is erroneous in its analysis of the conflicts of interest and ineffective assistance on
appeal claims.

Q

Appointment of Experts and Investigators
Justice Stewart's opinion presents indigent, condemned prisoners with an impossible
"Catch-22" - a defendant in a postconviction proceeding is entitled to funding for experts
and investigators, if he can show that a constitutional right was violated in his conviction, but
in many cases can't establish a constitutional violation without investigative and expert
assistance. (Slip op. at 18-19, n.5).1 This dilemma is illustrated in the instant case, with the
result that Mr. Gardner has not had a full and fair opportunity to challenge his conviction and
death sentence. It is absurdly paradoxical to conclude that funding for defense services was
not required because Mr. Gardner did not show "that he could not adequately pursue habeas
claims without appointed investigators and experts," while holding that the lack of expert
testimony to establish prejudice defeats his ineffective assistance claims.

DATED this 27th day of December, 1994.

C&AIG L. TRUMAN^ )
KAREN A. CHANE(Y/
MANNY GARCIA
Attorneys for Ronnie Lee Gardner
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Justice Stewart's suggestion, although perhaps attempting to deal with the
recognized inequities of requiring capital defendants to litigate their postconviction claims
without compensated counsel or the assistance of experts and investigators, will be difficult to
implement, and will have some unusual ramifications. Delaying compensation until
constitutional issues have been finally resolved by the courts does little to provide the funding
necessary to prepare the case. Further, tying the right to compensated assistance to the
demonstration of a constitutional violation appears similar to authorizing a contingent fee
agreement in a criminal case.

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I certify that a copy of this Petition for Rehearing was placed in the United States
Mail, postage prepaid and addressed to Marian Decker, Office of the Attorney General, 236
State Capitol, Salt Lake City, Utah 84114, on this 27th day of December, 1994.

10

